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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
33
Kiernan's
without changing the New York rule of evidence in any manner,
34
law
of
matter
a
confession may be determined involuntary, as
It is true, as the New York Court of Appeals notes, 35 that Wade testified
at the trial while Kiernan did not. Kiernan, having a criminal record, obviously
chose to rely upon the evidence of involuntariness illicited from other witnesses
rather than place himself in the worst possible light before the jury by having
this record revealed through the certain attempt of the district attorney to
impeach him. The decision of the federal courts will not rest upon Kiernan's
failure to testify, but upon his rebutting the State's evidence of voluntariness,
with evidence however adduced.

ACTS: "LOITERING"; "BARBITuATE
PRESCRIPTIONS"
In order to validly impose criminal liability, a statute must, on its face,
inform the public of the acts to be avoided. 36 This general standard, laid down
37
in United States v. Brewer, has consistently been followed in New York.
Twice during the 1958 term, the New York Court of Appeals was called
upon to determine the validity of statutes challenged on the ground they were
not sufficiently informative as required; one concerned with barbituate prescrip39
tions,88 the other with loitering.
A provision of the Sanitary Code of the City of New York was attacked in
People v. Caswell-Massey Co.40 The challenged section provided in its first
subdivision that telephonic barbituate prescriptions could be filled without ever
being reduced to writing; in its third subdivision, that prescriptions for barbituates may not be refilled unless the original contains authorization in writing
to do so. Reasoning from the impossibility of there being written authorization
in an oral prescription, while refill of barbituate prescriptions is allowed under
subdivision three generally, the majority (4-3) struck the provision as confusing to the ordinarily intelligent person.
The dissent insists there is no confusion about what is prohibited by
the statute. Notwithstanding that a telephonic prescription, never reduced
to writing, is valid and lawful, no original prescription not containing express
written authorization for refilling, may be refilled.
Conceding the validity of the dissent's argument, there remains the
instance of an original prescription, in whatever form, reordered orally by
the same physician for the same patient, the instance, in fact, upon which the
Caswell-Massey case arises. Recognizing that the court is striking this statute
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That embodied in Section 395, N.Y. CoDE Csm. PROC.
Malinski v. New York, supra.
People v. Kiernan, supra at 276, 189 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217.
United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278 (1891).
People v. Vetri, 309 N.Y. 401, 131 N.E.2d 568 (1955); People v. Firth, 3 N.Y.2d
N.Y.S.2d 949 (1957).
People v. Caswell-Massey Co., 6 N.Y.2d 497, 190 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1959).
People v. Johnson, 6 N.Y.2d 549, 190 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1959).
Supra note 38.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
because of uncertainty upon its face, and not because it was invalidly applied,
the majority decision seems to rest, though it is not clearly articulated, upon
the fact that the section in question does not proscribe the "refilling" in such
circumstances with the sufficiency required by the Brewer case.41
On the same day it decided the Caswell-Massey case, the Court in People
v. Johnson,42 upheld Section 722-b, 4 3 of the New York Penal Law. Defendant
argued that the use of the words "loiter," or "loitering," alone, were insufficient to describe the acts made criminal by the statute.
In 1953, the Court, in People v. Bell,44 upheld a provision of the New
York Penal Law which provided:
Any person who loiters about any toilet, station or station platform
of a subway or elevated railway or of a railroad, or who is found
sleeping therein or thereon and who is unable to give satisfactory
explanation of his presence is guilty of an offense."
Both the majority and the dissent in the Bell case, agreed that if the section
had ended without the proviso, ". . . and who is unable to give satisfactory
explanation of his presence... ," its validity would be unquestionable for the
word "loiter" had taken on a definite meaning by long statutory usage. 40
In 1958, however, the Court struck the "loitering" ordinance of the City
of Dunkirk in the case of People v. Diaz,47 the statute providing simply,
"No person shall lounge or loiter about any street or street comer in the City
of Dinkirk." In declaring the ordinance void, the Court said, "while the
term loiter . . . has by long usage acquired a common and accepted meaning,
it does not follow that by itself, and without more, such term is enough to
inform a citizen of its criminal implications... ." The Court further explained
its position by reference to the New York Penal Law, wherein "loiter" was
used to "point up" the prohibited act, viz: with the intent to commit a breach
of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is committed. 48 Used in this
manner, the term becomes significant and convictions will not be reversed for
lack of clarity as to the act proscribed. 49 Since "loitering," by definition, may
include innocent conduct, the Court concluded that the Dunkirk ordinance,
41.

Supra note 36.

42. Supra note 39.

N.Y. PEN. LAW § 722-b:
Any person not the parent or legal guardian of a pupil in regular attendance at said school who loiters in or about any school building or
grounds without written permission from the principal, custodian or
other person in charge thereof, or in violation of posted rules or regulations governing the use thereof, shall be guilty of disorderly conduct.
44. People v. Bell, 306 N.Y. 110, 115 N.E.2d 821 (1953).
43.

45.

N.Y. PEx.

LAW § 1990-a(2).

46. The majority holds the clause beginning ". . . and who is unable . . . ,"is
merely a procedure for determining whether the suspect is legitimately present, and
does not affect the substance of the provision.
47. People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 176 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1958).
48. N.Y. PEN. LAw § 722.
49. People v. Galpern, 259 N.Y. 279, 181 N.E. 572, 83 A.L.R. 785 (1932); People
v. Gaskin, 306 N.Y. 837, 118 N.E.2d 903 (1954).
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using the word "loiter" alone, did not establish a sufficiently specific standard
of criminality.
From the point of view of the Diaz case, it is difficult to see how the Court
could uphold Section 722-b attacked in Johnson, which similarly proscribes
only, "loitering." No other words of Section 722-b purport to further define
the act; no distinction between innocent conduct and conduct calculated to
harm, both embraced in the term "loiter," is made. If Section 722-b is to be
upheld, it must be on the rationale of the Bell case, that the nature of the
place where loitering is prohibited is such that all, and any, manner of "loitering" may be prohibited. In both Bell and Johnson, unlike Diaz, the legitimate purposes of the place at which loitering was proscribed are limited. The
clear intent of the legislature in the former cases is to insure that no other
activities are there pursued.5 0 In these circumstances, a distinction perhaps
not clearly made by the court, statutes which proscribe "loitering" without
further definition seem to sufficiently specify that which is made criminal.
Analysis of the Caswell-Massey case, and the Johnson case, reveals a
further following of the principle enunciated in Brewer. In each case, the
Court faced the question of whether the statute clearly reached the type of
activity in which the defendant was engaged, and did so in words which, read
in context, leave no doubt that his conduct is proscribed. The Courts' articulation of its reasoning may be open to some criticism, however, particularly in
the Johnson case. After the Diaz case in 1958, it would appear that a "loiterig" statute had to distinguish innocent from harmful conduct. Although the
Court distinguishes Johnson from Diaz on grounds of the locus of the act,
that distinction seems insufficient to vary the result of Diaz unless it is further
made clear that the manner of loitering is not significant in all situations, viz:
People v. Bell.51
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To APPELLATE REVIEW

IN
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Appellant was convicted of first degree manslaughter.52 The minutes of
the trial were not filed pursuant to Section 456 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.5 3 While incarcerated, defendant prosecuted an appeal to the Appellate Division, in forma pauperis, and for assignment of counsel. No record
of the trial was available to him, nor to the Appellate Court. The appeal was
dismissed, since no record or brief had been filed with the court, and there
50. "... and who is unable to give satisfactory explanation of his presence ....
N.Y. PEr. LAw § 1990-a(2), supra; "Any person not the parent or legal guardian of a
pupil . . . " "... without written permission from the principal, custodian or other
person in charge thereof, or in violation of posted rules or regulations governing the use
thereof.. . ." N.Y. PEN. LAW § 722-b, supra.
51. Supra note 44.
52. People v. Pitts, 6 N.Y.2d 288, 189 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1959).

53. Section 456 provides;
that upon a defendant's conviction for a crime, the court clerk, within
two days after notice of appeal has been served upon him, shall notify
the stenographer that an appeal has been taken. The stenographer shall
within ten days of such notice deliver to the clerk a copy of the stenographic minutes of the trial which shall be filed in the clerk's office.

